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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Appellant Richard Lynn Carlson objects to the State's
attempt to redefine the issues presented for review on appeal.
Instead of reviewing the issues as presented by the appellant,
the State would prefer that this Court review a variation of
those issues more favorable to it by presupposing legal
conclusions.
The first issue properly presented for review is whether the
prosecutor's interrogation of the witnesses and argument to the
jury were so improper and prejudicial as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial.

The State presupposes the answer to this issue

by inserting a legal conclusion irrelevant to the issue.

The

State claims that because the witnesses had a motivation to lie
and defense counsel "supposedly" agreed with the prosecutor's
statements, the prosecutor's improper conduct is excusable.

This

is an irrelevant side issue raised in an effort to remove this
Court's focus from the gravity of the real issue.

Even if true,

the appellee's conclusions do not justify the Prosecutor's
conduct at trial.
The final two issues that defendant asks this Court to
review are whether the prosecutor's misconduct was sufficiently
obvious and harmful to constitute "plain error" and whether
defense counsel's failure to object constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.

Appellant notes that when framing the
1

ineffective assistance issue, the State fails to acknowledge
defense counsel's failure to object, which is supposedly so
relevant to excuse the prosecutor's misconduct.
Appellant asserts that any other issues are not relevant and
should not be considered.

Appellant, and not the State, has

properly framed the issues in this appeal for this Court's
review.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTORS EXPRESSION OP HIS OPINION REGARDING THE
CREDIBILITY OF DEFENSE WITNESSES CONSTITUTED MISCONDUCT
REGARDLESS OF DEFENSE COUNSEL'S OPINION
The State excuses the prosecutor's prejudicial comments
because the defendant's counsel "concurred."

The prosecutor's

comments regarding the credibility of defense witnesses were
improper and prejudicial, regardless of whether defense counsel
concurred.

Whether defense counsel's actions were "ineffective

assistance" does not excuse the prosecutor's misconduct.

The

Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that:
A prosecutor engages in misconduct when he or she
asserts personal knowledge of the facts in issue or
expresses personal opinion, being a form of unsworn,
unchecked testimony [which] tend[s] to exploit the
influence of the prosecutor's office and undermine the
objective detachment that should separate a lawyer from
the cause being argued.
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1284 (Utah 1989)(quoting State
v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1255-56 (Utah 1988)).
2

See also State

v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1989); ABA Standards of
Criminal Justice, §3-5.8 (2d ed.1980).
Such a rule could not be more clear.

Plaintiff does not

dispute the fact that the prosecutor's statements at issue are
assertions of personal opinion.

Rather, plaintiff claims that

such statements are permissible under current Utah case law or,
at a minimum, are acceptable because the prosecutor's opinion was
confirmed by defense counsel.
Plaintiff first tries to justify the prosecutor's improper
statement by arguing the general principle that parties are
awarded considerably more freedom in closing argument.
Brief at 9 ) .

(Appellee

However, this general rule does not supersede the

well settled legal and ethical rules that it is improper for a
prosecutor to express his personal opinion regarding the truth or
falsity of any testimony, evidence or guilt of the defendant,
whether in opening or in closing argument.

No where do the above

authorities make a distinction as to when a prosecutor may ignore
his duty to refrain from improper expressions of personal
opinion.

Rather, the rule suggests that any expression of

personal opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony,
evidence or guilt of the defendant is improper and prejudicial.
The State also refers to several comments made by the
prosecutor at trial to which defense counsel lodged no objection.
(Appellee Brief at 12). The State creates its own Hobson's
choice.

There was no objection to these comments either because
3

they were not improper, prejudicial or because defense counsel
was ineffective in her assistance*
Furthermore, a close comparison between one of these
comments and one of the challenged comments reveals important
distinctions.

For the prosecutor to argue that witness Todd

Dennis had a motive to lie to avoid a "snitch" label might
arguably be a permissible inference which he could reasonably
make from the evidence.

See State v. Cumminsf 839 P.2d 848 (Utah

App. 1992); State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989).

Such a

characterization still permits a jury to weigh all the evidence
and objectively reach its own conclusions about the credibility
it should assign to the numerous inferences which may be drawn
from the evidence.

However, the statement, "the State admits

defense witnesses have not been credible" sends an entirely
different message to the jury.

Through this statement, the

prosecutor blatantly told the jury what to conclude regarding the
defense witnesses' credibility instead of letting the jury reach
its own conclusions from the evidence.

The danger of this

comment is discussed more fully in Appellant's Brief, p. 9.
This prosecutorial comment is exactly the type of comment
which the Court said was improper in State v. Hopkins.

It seems

difficult to imagine how a prosecutor could use more
authoritative words than "...the defense witnesses have not been
credible."

The reasonable impact of these words is likely to

induce the jury to trust the prosecutor's judgment regarding the
4

witnesses, rather than its own view of the witnesses and
evidence.

Id.

Even the State recognizes the potency of its prosecutor's
statement.

In its brief, the State attempts to alter the record

by suggesting that the prosecutor "submits" instead of "admits"
(Appellee Brief at 12) in a vain attempt to ameliorate the
impact.

The record stands as it is, and cannot be changed by

mere ellipses in a brief.

The prosecutor's argument, as

recorded, sends a powerful message to the jury regarding the
testimony of the defense witnesses, a message not permitted.
The prosecutor's statements to the jury were particularly
potent in light of the mere circumstantial evidence of guilt and
because this case hinged on witness credibility.

At the outset,

the trial judge recognized the prominent role that the witnesses
would play:

"At first glance, it would appear to me that

credibility is going to be very important in this particular
case." (R.9).

The only evidence that the defendant was a

perpetrator of the victim's injury was the testimony of what the
victim claims he saw after a blanket was thrown over him to
partially block his vision. (Appellant's Brief at 4-5).
Therefore, this case was simply a case of who the jury was to
believe; the testimony of the victim or the testimony of several
defense witnesses.

This is the very type of case a jury would be

"especially susceptible to influence" by a prosecutor's comment

5

or suggestions.

State v. Troy 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1984); See

also Appellant's Brief at 11-12.
While "the line which separates acceptable from improper
advocacy is often difficult to draw," Hopkins at 480, appellant
submits that the prosecutor clearly crossed that line in view of
his comments and the lack of any direct evidence that the
defendant was the perpetrator, other than the victim's testimony
while his back was turned.

The State's evidence of identity was

weak in this case and the prosecutor knew that his case hinged on
the credibility of his single "eye" witness.
Whether subconsciously or intentionally, the prosecutor
chose an improper tactic to influence the jury.

Whether defense

counsel arguably confirmed his opinion as to the credibility of
the witnesses is irrelevant.

At issue here is the prosecutor's

misconduct, defense counsel's failure to object to that
misconduct and the trial court's failure to cure the misconduct
in light of its obvious prejudice.

POINT II
THE PROSECUTOR IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTED TO IMPEACH WITNESS JOHN
HENDER WITH ACCUSATIONS NOT SUPPORTED BY ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
Upon cross examination of defense witness John Hender, the
prosecutor accused the witness with unsupported innuendos
regarding facts not in evidence.

(Appellant's Brief at 12-16).

The State argues that the prosecutor acted properly because the
6

challenged questions were directed to a witness other than the
accused.

(Appellee's Brief at 16). Although the rule, as

articulated in State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 786-87 (Utah 1992)
and State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 343 (Utah App. 1993) focuses
upon the examination of an accused in those instances, State v.
Peterson extends that similar protection to any witness:
Impeaching questions should not be propounded to a
witness unless they are based upon facts that the
interrogator intends to present in refutation of
adverse answering of questions propounded; such line of
questioning should be done in good faith, and not for
the purpose of prejudicing and arousing suspicion of
the jury against the defendant.
Peterson, 722 P.2d 768, 769-70 (Utah 1986)(quoting Riser v.
State, 67 Okl. Cr.16, 93 P.2d 58 (1939)).

This rule mandates

that questions which are intended to impeach a witness1 testimony
must have a basis in fact, which basis the interrogator is
prepared and intends to present.

It would be poor public policy

to allow a prosecutor to concoct a damaging line of questioning
so imaginative and overzealous that it would leave a jury with
the impression that a defendant, or defense witness, was anything
the questions, by innuendo, seemed to suggest.

See Emmett at

787, n.18.
In the present case, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the
testimony of John Hender by two improper lines of questioning.
(Appellant's Brief at pp. 13-16).

In short, the State's

questioning suggested that Mr. Hender had tampered with and
7

threatened a witness.

The prosecutor also suggested that the

witness was an eyewitness to the assault and thus was committing
perjury because he was not providing truthful testimony as to the
details of the assault.

Again, a felon's denial would be

outweighed by the prosecutor's suggestions.
However, as argued and demonstrated in Appellant's Brief at
pp. 15-17, the prosecutor never presented any admissible evidence
to substantiate these innuendos.

The only plausible purpose for

this prosecutorial tactic was to prejudice and arouse the jury
against the defendant and his witnesses.
The State argues that there was no need for the prosecutor
to substantiate his questions regarding what Mr. Hender knew
about the assault because "all the defense witnesses, including
Hender, knew more about this case than they were willing to say."
(Appellee's Brief at 19). This conclusory attack is strictly a
speculative opinion which is unsupported by the record and is
irrelevant to the issue before this Court.
Plaintiff also claims that the prosecutor did in fact
present evidence that Mr. Hender had contacted the victim and
threatened him.

(Appellee Brief at 19). However, the only

evidence to which the plaintiff refers was the testimony of the
victim.

The testimony is recorded as follows, "(Hender) was a

trustee at one time.

He comes up to me and tells me 'We are

still threatening you if you are still going to court or not, if
you do testify against Mr. Carlson.'" (R. 428). This testimony
8

is inadmissible hearsay which should have been objected to by
defense counsel.

POINT III
THE PROSECUTORS IMPROPER ASKING OP A WITNESS TO COMMENT ON
THE CREDIBILITY OF ANOTHER WITNESS CONSTITUTED ERROR.
Although Emmett refers to a criminal defendant commenting on
the veracity of another witness, the underlying reasons for the
rule apply to other defense witnesses other than a defendant.

In

Emmett f the Court explained why a question which asks a witness
to comment on the credibility of another witness is improper and
prejudicial.

The Court stated that:

The question is improper because it is argumentative
and seeks information beyond the witness1 competence.
The prejudicial effect of such a question lies in the
fact that it suggests to the jury that a witness is
committing perjury even though there are other
explanations for the inconsistency. In addition, it
puts the defendant in the untenable position of
commenting on the character and motivations of another
witness who may appear sympathetic to a jury.
Emmett, at 787.

Each of these concerns articulated by the Emmett

Court are applicable to this case.
The question, "So if Officer Tonga had come to court and
said he knew nothing about any wet blanket, how would you explain
that" is argumentative and seeks inadmissible opinion.

The

question also is prejudicial, despite the sustained objection,
because it suggests that the witness has perjured himself by
seeking comparison with an officer.
9

Surely, placing Mr. Hender's

testimony in direct conflict with Mr. Tonga's "supposed11
testimony unfairly calls into question the veracity of Mr.
Hender's testimony.

Since it is well settled that it is improper

for a defendant to comment on the veracity of the testimony of
another witness, Emmett at 787, the simple objection by defense
counsel was insufficient because the damage occurred in the
asking of the question.

By the time the objection was made, the

damage was already done.
Plaintiff asserts that any harm which resulted from the
prosecutor's improper questioning was negligible and not
prejudicial.

Plaintiff relies upon State v. Palmerr wherein this

Court concluded that although one improper question alone would
be harmless, five such errors were cumulatively seriously
harmful.

Palmerf 860 P.2d 339, 350 (Utah App. 1993).

Moreover,

the errors which this Court focused on in Palmer and found
cumulatively harmful are remarkably similar to the errors
challenged here.

The Palmer errors include: unsupported innuendo

in the prosecutor's questions, asking a witness to comment on the
veracity of another witness, and prosecutorial comments intending
to cause the jurors to believe there was more evidence of guilt
than had actually been introduced.

Palmer at 350.

"While any

one of these errors would in itself be harmless, their cumulative
effect is not."

Id.
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Whether the one improper question comparing the witness to
Officer Tonga may have been harmless by itself, the cumulative
effect of all of the errors by the prosecutor were not.

POINT IV
THE PROSECUTORS EXAMINATION INTO WITNESS DENNIS1 PAST
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS EXCEEDED ACCEPTABLE INQUIRY UNDER UTAH
RULE OF EVIDENCE 609(a)
As set forth in Appellant's brief, pp. 18-19, a prosecutor's
Rule 609(a) inquiry is limited to the nature of the crime, the
date of the conviction and the punishment.
800 P.2d 819, 822 (Utah App. 1990).

See State v. Tucker,

Plaintiff's brief attempts

to dismiss the prosecutor's violations of this rule by arguing
that any violation was technical and not obvious.

However, this

Court stated in Tucker that, "Generally, inquiry into the details
of prior convictions has been found to be so prejudicial as to
amount to plain error." Tucker at 821 (citations omitted).

The

only exception to this general rule in Tucker is not applicable
here.

Id. at 882.
The State, however, attempts to manufacture additional

"exceptions" to this rule.

Appellee argues that the prosecutor

did not "parade" the details of the prior crime in front of the
jury and took care to "insure" the witness was not convicted of
past crimes.

(Appellee's Brief at 26). Such "restraint11 by the

prosecutor is not an excusable exception in Tucker.

This Court

did not suggest that as long as a prosecutor avoided the above
11

courses of action, it could trample the Rule 609(a) limited
inquiry outlined in Tucker.
This Court's simple statements that, "A prosecutor may not
parade the details of the prior crime in front of the jury," and
"Care must be taken to insure the defendant is not convicted for
past rather than present crimes," Tucker at 822, cannot be read
as imposing a new litmus paper test on Rule 609(a) inquiry.
Therefore, the prosecutor's questions, set out in Appellant's
Brief, pp. 19-2 0, which went beyond the permissible scope of a
Rule 609(a) inquiry were prejudicial and amount to plain error.
I£. at 821.

CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be reversed and this case
remanded for a new trial.

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUEST
Defendant requests an oral argument regarding the various
issues presented for review.

Utah's law on the prosecutorial

issues raised in this appeal remains in the formative stage and
is very fact sensitive.

Oral argument will allow the parties to

clearly set forth their respective positions and respond to any
questions the Court may have as to the misconduct and Defendant's
prejudice.
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Respectfully submitted this

( /

day of June 1996.
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Attorney for Appellant
Richard Lynn Carlson
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